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STANDING AND THE ENGLISH PREROGATIVE
WRITS: THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING'
Bradley S. Clantont
"I am almost coming to the conclusion that all histories are bad.
Whenever one turns from the historian to the writings of the people
he deals with, there is always such a difference."
- C.S. Lewis
INTRODUCTION
In his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath,' Justice Felix Frankfurter attempted
to ground principles of justiciability, specifically the require-
"1997 Bradley S. Clanton. All Rights Reserved.
Associate, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C. I would like to thank
Professor Jeffrey Jackson of Mississippi College School of Law for his invaluable
assistance with this project, Karin Den Bleyker, Catalogue Librarian at Mississippi
College School of Law, for her tireless search for obscure sources, Christopher
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editing, and my wife, llie Clanton, for her patience through it alL The views
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1 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
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ment that a litigant in federal court have "standing" to bring
suit,2 in our common law history. Justice Frankfurter asserted
that federal courts must "not decide a question unless the
nature of the action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted,
and the relationship between the parties are such that judicial
determination is consonant with what was.., the business of
the Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the
Constitution was framed."' Moreover, if the constraints of his-
tory were not in themselves enough to sustain his position, 4
2 According to Justice Frankfurter, standing requires a litigant to be " 'inter-
ested in and affected adversely by the decision' of which he seeks review." Id. at
151 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Braxton County Court v. West Virginia
ex rel. Dillion, 208 U.S. 192, 197 (1908)). The interest "must not be wholly negligi-
ble," and the party "must show more than that 'he suffers in some indefinite way
in common with people generally.' " Id. (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 488 (1923)). More recently, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555
(1992), the Supreme Court held that the "core component of standing is an essen-
tial and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III," and
has three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,...
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical . . . .Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of-the injury has to be fairly... trace[able] to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant, and not ...th[e] result [of] the indepen-
dent action of some third party not before the court .... Third, it must
be likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be re-
dressed by a favorable decision.
Id. at 560-61 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, Lujan
provides that separation of powers principles limit Congress' ability to grant indi-
viduals standing by "convert[ing] the undifferentiated public interest in executive
officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right' vindicable in the courts,"
as to do so would "permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts
the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,' Art. II, § 3." Id. at 577.
3 McGrath, 341 U.S. at 150 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
' In light of modern notions of constitutional interpretation, this was very wise
indeed. See, e.g., LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1307 (2d ed.
1988) (The Court must "decide, in this society and at this time, whether a
person's choice to act or think in a certain way should be fundamentally protect-
ed."); William J. Brennan, Speech to the Text and Teaching Symposium of
Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 17 ("[Tlhe genius of the Constitution rests not in any
static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems .... What the
constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be their
measure to the vision of our time."); Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term
Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979) ("The function of the
judge is to give concrete meaning and application to our constitutional values.").
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Justice Frankfurter attempted to moor the doctrine of standing
in the separation of powers, stating that "[tihe scope and con-
sequences of the review with which the judiciary is entrusted
over the executive and legislative action require us to observe
these bounds fastidiously."'
More recently, Justice Antonin Scalia has argued that
standing has "deep roots in the common law understanding,
and hence the constitutional understanding, of what makes a
matter appropriate for judicial disposition.' Failure to observe
its boundaries, according to Justice Scalia, does "substantial
harm to a governmental structure designed to restrict the
courts to matters that actually affect the litigants before
them."
7
This view of standing became the law of the land in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife,' wherein the Court held that the
"Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers
depends largely upon common understanding of what activities
are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts.
The doctrine of standing, Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, is
one of the "landmarks" which "set[s] apart the 'Cases' and
'Controversies' that are of the justiciable sort referred to in
Article llI. "1o To ignore "the concrete injury requirement"
would be "discarding a principle fundamental to the separate
and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch-one of the
essential elements that identifies those 'Cases' and
'Controversies' that are the business of courts rather than of
the political branches.""
A few years after Justice Frankfurter wrote his concurring
opinion in McGrath, the late Professor Louis L. Jaffe accused
him of "exaggerat[ing] ... the precision of the tradition."'
5 McGrath, 341 U.S. at 150 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 339 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 342. Justice Scalia had previously published a law review article dis-
cussing his view of the relationship of standing and the separation of powers. See
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separa-
tion of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).
8 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
9 Id. at 559-60.
,' Id. at 560.
* Id. at 576.
Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HAV.
L. REV. 1265, 1308 (1961).
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Professor Jaffe based this assertion on the use of certain pre-
rogative writs in English courts during the eighteenth centu-
ry.1 Such writs were, according to Professor Jaffe, "used pri-
marily to control authorities below the level of central govern-
ment," 14 and "in prerogative proceedings in King's Bench the
character of the relator was often obscure or unstated."5 In-
deed, Jaffe wrote that "in the writ of prohibition, at least, there
is overt authority for allowing anyone to initiate the proceed-
ing."6 Thus, according to Professor Jaffe, "the courts of West-inster" at the time the Constitution was framed entertained
some proceedings wherein the party invoking the court's power
was without any personal interest in the relief sought.
Professor Raoul Berger also criticized Frankfurter's view
as "historically unfounded." 7 Berger asserted that "there
may be policy arguments in favor of a 'personal interest' limi-
tation on standing, but they cannot rest on historically-derived
constitutional compulsions."" Professor Berger stated that
"[g]iven a document which employed familiar English
terms--e.g., 'admiralty,' "bankruptcy,' 'trial by jury'-it is hard-
ly to be doubted that the Framers contemplated resort to Eng-
lish practice for elucidation." 9 And, after expanding on Pro-
fessor Jaffe's research on the English prerogative writs, Berger
concluded that "[a]t the adoption of the Constitution... the
English practice in prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, and
13 Id. at 1269.
14 Id. Cf. 10 SiR WiLLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 157 (3d
ed. 1975). Holdsworth explains:
[Slince breaches of the law, arising either from misfeasance or non-fea-
sance, were generally a cause of action at the suit of the individual in.
jured by them, civil proceedings could be taken against all the officials of
the local government by persons who had been injured by negligent or
wilful breaches of the law committed by them.... This responsibility of
the local government to the law, at the suit of an injured individual, had
been a well-recognized principle of the medieval common law. . . . [The]
liability of the officials of the local government to be sued by aggrieved
persons may, in some cases, have pressed hardly upon them.
Id. (emphasis added).
" Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1308.
16 Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1308.
" Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Re.
quirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 840 (1969).
'8 Id. at 840.
'9 Id. at 816.
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informers' and relators' actions encouraged strangers to attack
unauthorized action."2
The conclusions reached by Jaffe and Berger have been
eagerly accepted by legal scholars, with virtually no skepticism
or dissent.2' A few specific examples should suffice. Professor
Steven L. Winter cites Berger without hesitation for the propo-
sition that in pre-Revolution English practice, " 'standingless'
suits against illegal government action could be brought via
the prerogative writs of mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari
issued by the King's Bench." Professor Cass R. Sunstein
quotes Jaffe's conclusion that the " 'English tradition of locus
standi in prohibition and certiorari is that a "stranger" has
standing.' "3 In fact, Sunstein goes on to cite Berger's article
extensively and with great deference,24 to the point of accept-
ing Professor Berger's statement that a 1724 case, Arthur v.
Commissioners of Sewers,' "indicated that 'one who comes
merely as a stranger' was entitled to discretionary relief by
writ of certiorari,26 even though that case never mentions the
term "stranger."2 Professor Evan Tsen Lee asserts that
"[ajrticles by Raoul Berger and Professor Louis Jaffe demon-
strate that English practice permitted 'strangers' to bring ac-
tions vindicating the public interest in the enforcement of
public obligations.'
Surprisingly (but then perhaps not), many of the same
scholars who have so readily accepted the conclusions reached
by Berger and Jaffe have used those same conclusions to ridi-
20 I, at 827 (emphasis in original).
21 See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article I:k Perspectives on the
'Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 300 (1979); Evan Ten
Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 603, 638-39 (1992); Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of "Unconsti-
tutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 865,
1007 n.675 (1994); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law
Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1151-53 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing
After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, 'njuries," and Article JI, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163,
171-73 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1396 (1988).
' Winter, supra note 21, at 1396.
Sunstein, supra note 21, at 171 (quoting Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1274).
2, Sunstein, supra note 21, at 171-73.
88 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1724).
26 Sunstein, supra note 21, at 171-72 (quoting Berger, supra note 17, at 821).
See discussion infra notes 128-38 and accompanying text.
Lee, supra note 21, at 638.
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cule Justice Scalia's view that standing has "deep roots in the
common law understanding." For example, after citing what he
calls the "compelling efforts" of Berger and Jaffe, Professor
Gene R. Nichol, Jr. states that in Lujan, "Justice Scalia, per-
haps surprisingly (but then perhaps not), ignored the scholar-
ship of the history of Article I."" s Professor Nichol chides
Justice Scalia for his hypocrisy in asserting that for purposes
of substantive due process analysis, the limitations on the
authority of democratic government may be found "only by
exploring 'the most specific level at which [the] relevant tradi-
tion... can be identified,' ,30 while a " 'new' tradition finds a
ready judicial home" for purposes of limiting the power of fed-
eral courts."
Professor Lee also scolds Justice Scalia for failing to offer
any "evidence that English practice in fact conformed to the
dispute resolution model he exalted."32 According to Lee,
"Berger's and Jaffe's historical works thus disprove Justice
Scalia's assertion that the common law understanding
dispositively favors reading 'cases' and 'controversies' to impose
a personal stake requirement."33 Professor Sunstein states
with absolute certainty that, "[als a matter of history, we have
seen that Scalia's claim is not sound; in fact, it is baseless," as
"courts had 'traditionally entertained' a wide variety of suits
instituted by strangers."'
29 Nichol, supra note 21, at 1152. Professor Nichol also cites Professor Winter's
article for the proposition that the prerogative writs did not require individual
injury, Nichol, supra note 21, at 1151 (citing Winter, supra note 21, at 1397), and
commends Professor Sunstein's efforts in "plow[ing] these same furrows." Nichol,
supra note 21, at 1152 (citing Sunstein, supra note 21, at 177). Sunstein and
Nichol both relied on the conclusions of Professors Berger and Jaffe, see Sunstein,
supra note 21, at 171-72, and Nichol, supra note 21, at 1161-52, and therefore
reached the same (erroneous) conclusions. Professor Nichol also cites an article
which he believes demonstrates that "qui tam suits have enjoyed a long an unmo-
lested history in the United States." Nichol, supra note 21, at 1152 (citing Evan
Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L. J. 341 (1989)).
Justice Scalia ignored these works, according to Nichol, in order to create the
Lujan opinion perhaps "not ... from whole cloth, but the source of its fabric is at
least mysterious." Id. at 1153.
" Nichol, supra note 21, at 1153 (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 128 n.6 (1989)).
31 Nichol, supra note 21, at 1153.
32 Lee, supra note 21, at 637.
Lee, supra note 21, at 639.
3, Sunstein, supra note 21, at 214.
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Of course, one need not look long to discover exactly why
many of these scholars have so eagerly accepted the version of
history promoted by Berger and Jaffe, and why they use that
history to attack Justice Scalia's (and now the Supreme
Court's) view that standing has its origins in the common law
understanding of the role of the judiciary. Professor Winter
advocates a "dual model system of adjudication" which
"recogniz[es] both private and public rights," and "provides one
legal mechanism through which we can seek and attempt to
maintain a sense both that we are individuals and that what
happens to varied communities upon which we depend matters
very much to each of us."' This dual system will help to over-
come the "individualist ideology embedded in the social con-
struct of standing" which is part of the "fragmented" society in
which "wle are less and less capable of bridging the gaps of
race, wealth, and sectional need."" One engaged in the pur-
suit of these lofty aims certainly cannot allow the "social con-
struct" of standing to get in the way.
Professor Sunstein has concluded that the current stand-
ing doctrine is "an invention of federal judges" and a "misinter-
pretation of the Constitution."37 He believes that "injury in
fact is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for stand-
ing," and "is a form of Lochner-style substantive due pro-
cess."" Indeed, Sunstein advocates the "intriguing possibility"
that Congress "create property rights in the benefits provided
by regulatory statutes and.., establish standing to vindicate
those property rights," 9 or that "Congress create a system of
bounties for citizens in cases involving both private defendants
and the executive branch." This is certainly not as dramatic
as Professor Winter's assertion, but nevertheless revealing.
Professor Lee supports a "public values" model of adjudica-
tion, wherein "the primary task of a judge is not to resolve the
dispute at bar, but rather to give concrete meaning to our
Winter, supra note 21, at 1514-15.
Winter, supra note 21, at 1514.
Sunstein, supra note 21, at 166.
38 Sunstein, supra note 21, at 236.
" Sunstein, supra note 21, at 168.
"Sunstein, supra note 21. Although such a "bounty system would not violate
the "personal stake" requirement of standing, it would likely violate other
constitutional principles. See discussion infra note 47 and accompanying text.
1997] 1007
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public values, to illustrate how our public and constitutional
values play out in the real world."4 In Lee's world, adjudica-
tion "is the process through which the meaning of our public
values is revealed or elaborated." 2 There is certainly no room
for an "injury in fact" requirement when one is attempting to
"give concrete meaning to our public values."
Dean Nichol also favors "public law litigation"43 wherein
lawsuits are brought for "the vindication of constitutional or
statutory interests," rather than "private, common law
right[s]."' He criticizes the injury requirement as "amor-
phous, complex, and value-laden,""5 and concludes that "noth-
ing in the Constitution demands a private rights model of
adjudication-not its language, not its history, nor its struc-
ture, and not the standards fashioned to measure access." 46
The simple fact of the matter is that none of these scholars
has, for obvious reasons, seriously questioned the conclusions
reached by Berge5 and Jaffe regarding the English prerogative
writs during the eighteenth century. On the contrary, the re-
search of Berger and Jaffe has been eagerly accepted by those
who reject the "private rights" model of adjudication, and who
advocate a more active role for the courts in defining our "pub-
lic values." The purpose of this Article is to perform that diffi-
cult task for them by closely examining the English preroga-
live writ practice during the eighteenth century. That exami-
nation will reveal that "standingless" proceedings were not
commonplace, as Professors Jaffe and Berger concluded, but
that a "personal stake" or standing was indeed necessary to
invoke the power of English courts in prerogative proceedings
during the eighteenth century.47
' Lee, supra note 21, at 627-28.
42 Lee, supra note 21, at 627-28.
Nichol, supra note 21, at 1166.
" Nichol, supra note 21, at 1166.
Nichol, supra note 21, at 1157.
46 Nichol, supra note 21, at 1169.
' Professor Jaffe stated that the "English tradition of locus standi in prohibi-
tion and certiorari is that 'a stranger' has standing, but relief in suits by strang-
ers is discretionary." Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1274. Jaffe did, however, note that in
all of the cases he analyzed the "so-called 'strangers' . . . were technical strangers
to the record but otherwise persons with a special interest." Jaffe, supra note 12,
at 1274. Jaffe also suggested that the writ of mandamus "might" have been avail-
able to a stranger, but his only authority for this proposition was his belief that
"the list of cases in the digests strongly suggest the possibility that the plaintiff in
1008 [Vol. 63: 1001
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I. THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION
Professor Berger first cited the writ of prohibition as "the
clearest example" of "pre-Constitution English law" that dem-
onstrates that "attacks by strangers on action in excess of
jurisdiction were a traditional concern of the courts in West-
minster."8 Likewise, Professor Jaffe stated that the "English
tradition of locus standi in prohibition.., is that 'a stranger'
has standing, but relief in suits by strangers is discretion-
ary.' Berger quoted as authority Sir Edward Coke's account
of the Third Answer of the judges in a document known as the
Articulo Cleri:
"Prohibitions by law are to be granted at any time to restraine a
court to intermeddle with, or execute any thing, which by law they
ought not to hold plea of, and they are much mistaken that
maintaine the contrary .... And the kings courts that may award
prohibitions, being informed either by the parties themselves, or by
any stranger, that any court temporall or ecclesiasticall doth hold
plea of that (whereof they have not jurisdiction) may lawfully pro-
hibit the same, as well after judgment and execution as before.
Berger stated that "no English court, so far as I can discover,
has ever rejected the authority of Articulo Cleri or denied that
a writ of prohibition may be granted at the suit of a strang-
er."5 ' Furthermore, according to Berger, "Coke was cited by
the 18th century Abridgments.""
Well, it is likely true that no one has ever rejected the
authority of the Articulo Cleri. And it is also likely true that no
English court ever denied that the writ of prohibition was
available to a "stranger." The question then becomes (a ques-
some of them was without a personal interest." Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1274.
Berger, on the other hand, cited (without reservation) the writs of "prohibition,
certiorari, quo warranto, and informers' and relators' action? as actually
"encourag[ing] strangers to attack unauthorized action." Berger, supra note 17, at
827. Because Professor Berger more fully developed the proposition suggested by
Jaffe, many (if not most) of my comments will be directed toward the conclusions
reached by Professor Berger.
Berger, supra note 17, at 819.
" Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1274.
Berger, supra note 17, at 819 (quoting 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 602 (1797)).
51 Berger, supra note 17, at 819.
52 Berger, supra note 17, at 819. (citing 4 J. COmYNS, DIGEST, "Prohibition" (E)
(1766); and 4 MATTHEW BACON, ABRIDGMENT, "Prohibition" (C) (3d ed. 1768)).
1997] 1009
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tion Berger failed to answer): What meaning did the term
stranger have to the judges in the Articulo Cleri? Berger sim-
ply assumed that by "stranger" they were referring to a person
with no interest in obtaining the writ. This was, as shall be
demonstrated herein, a risky assumption.
Professor Jaffe's authority for the proposition that strang-
ers could seek a writ of prohibition is a book by Professor S.A.
de Smith, a law professor at Cambridge. 3 Jaffe recognized,
however, the fact that the word "stranger" is not unambiguous,
as he noted that in all of the cases cited by Professor de Smith,
"the so-called 'strangers'. .. were technical strangers to the
record but otherwise persons with a special interest."" Profes-
sor de Smith himself wrote that
[i]n the various assertions that a 'stranger' has locus standi it is not
always clear who is understood to be a stranger. Sometimes the
term seems to mean merely a person who was not a party to the
proceedings sought to be prohibited; it does not necessarily follow
that the court would have been prepared to accord standing to some-
one who had no personal interest whatsoever to protect in moving
for a prohibition. 5
Professor de Smith in turn cites the work of Professor S.M.
Thio for this proposition.56
Professor Thio also traced the history of the notion that a
"stranger" could seek a writ of prohibition to the judges' re-
sponse to the third objection of the Articulo Cleri, quoted in
Coke's Institutes.57 However, according to Thio, the term
"stranger" as used by the judges in the Articulo Cleri, was 'in
contradistinction to a party to the proceedings sought to be
prohibited. In other words, a stranger denotes a non-party." 8
Furthermore, Thio found that it "is not clear from the cases
" Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1274 n.35 (citing S. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 308 (1959)).
" Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1274. This statement will prove to be somewhat
prophetic.
51 S.A. DE SfITH, JUDICIAL REvIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 368 n.33 (3d
ed. 1973).
56 Id. (citing S.M. THIO, LOCUS STANDi AND JUDICIAL REvIEW 79 (1974)).
51 S.M. Tmo, Locus STANDi AND JUDICIAL REvIEW 81-2 (1971).
" Id. at 82. The exact language quoted by Coke was that "the kings [sic]
courts ... may award prohibitions, being informed either by the parties them-
selves, or by any stranger." Berger, supra note 17, at 819 (quoting 2 EDWARD
COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *602 (1797)).
1010 [Vol. 63: 1001
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whether the term 'stranger' as employed by the courts denotes
any non-party to a dispute irrespective of his interest, or only a
non-party who possesses some interest in the dispute.' It is
this ambiguity that Professors Berger and Jaffe failed to ad-
dress.
Clearly one does not have to look hard in the legal writ-
ings of the eighteenth century to find language supporting the
proposition that a "stranger" could obtain a writ of prohibition.
In addition to the language cited by Berger from Coke, Thomas
Wood wrote that prohibition issued
out of Chancery, King's Bench or Common Pleas to Forbid a Judge,
&c. in the Spiritual Court, Admiralty, Court of Chiualry, &c. to
Proceed in a Cause that belongs to the Common Law-Courts, or that
belongs not to their Jurisdiction, tho' the Courts at law can give no
Remedy, Or it may Forbid a Judge of any Temporal Court to proceed
in a Cause depending before him, upon Suggestion that the Cogni-
zance of the Cause does not belong to Him. The King's Courts, that
may award Prohibitions, being informed by Plaintiff or Defendant,
or by any Stranger, That any Court temporal or Ecclesiastical do
Hold Plea where They have no Jurisdiction, may lawfully prohibit
that Court, as well after Judgment and Execution as before.p
Matthew Bacon wrote that the purpose of the writ of pro-
hibition was to "preserve the Right of the King's Crown and
Courts, and the Ease and Quiet of the Subject.'"' The writ of
prohibition, which most held was discretionary, would issue
out of the "Superior Courts of Westminster, having a Superin-
tendency over all Inferior Courts.'c Moreover, the Chancery
Court could issue the writ,s and the king could sue for a writ
of prohibition,
tho' the Plea in the Spiritual Court be between two common Per-
sons, because the Suit is in Derogation of his Crown and Dignity. So
if the Ecclesiastical Court will hold Plea of any Matter which be-
longs not to their Jurisdiction, upon Information thereof to the
" TEIO, supra note 57, at 82.
THOmAS WOOD, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 570 (3d ed. 1724)
(emphasis in original) [hereinafter WOOD'S INSTITUTE].
6' 4 MAATTHEw BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMUENT OF THE LAw 240 (1736) [hereinaf-
ter BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT].
4 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT supra note 61, at 241 (italics omitted).
63 4 BACON'S ABRIDGEMEENT, supra note 61, at 241.
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King's Courts, either by the Plaintiff, Defendant, or by a meer [sic]
Stranger, a Prohibition will issue."
Other sources contain the same language.'
However, nothing in any of these eighteenth century writ-
ings suggests that the term "stranger" was used to refer to an
individual with no personal interest in the relief sought. In
fact, statements from authoritative legal writings of eighteenth
century England reveal that a "stranger" could not, as Berger
and Jaffe assumed, seek a writ of prohibition 'ithout... a
showing of injury to his .personal interest."6 Rather, the
"stranger" who could seek a writ of prohibition was one who
was neither the plaintiff nor defendant in the proceedings in
the court below (nor in privity with the plaintiff or defendant),
but who nevertheless had some significant personal interest in
obtaining the writ of prohibition.
One of the most authoritative and illuminating expres-
sions of this personal stake requirement is found on the very
next page of Bacon's Abridgment after the "stranger" language
appears. Bacon wrote, with notable clarity, that "no Man is
entitled to a Prohibition unless he is in Danger of being injured
by some Suit actually depending."67 Moreover, not only was
personal injury necessary, Bacon said that the harm had to be
imminent, as "[a] Prohibition quia timet does not lie."" Thus,
according to Bacon, one had to allege that he was in imminent
danger of being personally injured by proceedings in an inferi-
or court in order to obtain a writ of prohibition.
Blackstone's discussion of the writ of prohibition also sup-
ports the conclusion that a "stranger" had to assert some immi-
" 4 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 243.
"See, e.g., THOMtAS CUNNiNGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (2d
ed. 1771) (Court may grant prohibition "upon information thereof to the King's
courts, either by the plaintiff, defendant, or by a meer [sic] stranger") [hereinafter
CUNNINGHAM'S DICTIONARY].
"6 Berger, supra note 17, at 820.
6 4 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 244 (emphasis added). See also
CUNNINGHAM'S DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at Prohibition ("But no man is intitled
[sic] to a prohibition unless he is in danger of being injured by some suit actually
depending... ").
6" 4 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 244. "Quia timet" literally means
"because he fears." 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 13 (1989). In law it refers
to "[a]n action brought to prevent possible future injury." Id. See also BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1247 (6th ed. 1990) (quia timet means literally "[blecause he fears or
apprehends").
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nent personal injury in order to obtain a writ of prohibition.
Blackstone's discussion of the writ of prohibition is found at
the beginning of the section of his commentaries wherein he
would "consider such injuries as are cognizable by the courts of
the common law.... For it is a settled and invariable principle
in the laws of England, that every right when with-held must
have a remedy, and every injury its proper redress.' Before
going into all of the "numerous injuries" and "their respective
legal remedies," however, there were, according to Blackstone,
"two species of injuries; which will properly fall now within our
immediate consideration."70
The "first of these injuries" was the "refusal or neglect of
justice" which was "remedied either by writ of procedendo, or
of mandamus."7' The second injury was "that of encroachment
of jurisdiction, or calling one coram non judice, to answer in a
court that has no legal cognizance of the cause."72 Such an
injury was "a grievance, for which the common law has provid-
ed a remedy by the writ of prohibition."3 According to
Blackstone, the writ of prohibition was
a writ issuing properly only out of the court of king's bench, being
the king's prerogative writ; but, for the furtherance ofjustice, it may
now also be had in some cases out of the court of chancery, common
pleas, or exchequer; directed to the judge and parties of a suit in any
inferior court, commanding them to cease from the prosecution
thereof, upon a suggestion that either the cause originally, or some
collateral matter arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdiction,
but to the cognizance of some other court'
Blackstone never suggested that one without any interest in
the proceedings could seek a writ of prohibition.
Indeed, Blackstone's most telling statement for our purpos-
es was made when he was describing the "methods of proceed-
ing upon prohibitions":
69 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMENTARIEs 109 (emphasis added) [hereinafter
BLACEsTONV'S CoMMENTARiEs].
70 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARiEs, supra note 69, at 109. Blackstone had just
finished discussing the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts.
7' 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 109 (emphasis in original).
For a thorough treatment of the writ of mandamus, see discussion infra notes
263-96 and accompanying text.
7 3 BLACKSTONE'S COAMIENTARIES, supra note 69, at 111 (emphasis in original).
3 BLACKSTONE'S CoMMARIES, supra note 69 (emphasis in original).
7' 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIS, supra note 69, at 112.
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The party aggrieved in the court below applies to the superior court,
setting forth in a suggestion upon record the nature and cause of his
complaint, in being drawn ad aliud examen, by a jurisdiction or
manner of process disallowed by the laws of the kingdom: upon
which, if the matter alleged appears to the court to be sufficient, the
writ of prohibition immediately issues; commanding the judge not to
hold, and the party not to prosecute, the plea."
Furthermore, Blackstone wrote that "if either the judge or the
party shall proceed after such prohibition, an attachment may
be had against them, to punish them for the contempt, at the
discretion of the court that awarded it; and an action will lie
against them, to repair the party injured in damages."
Blackstone was clearly familiar with Coke's Institutes, as
he cited Coke on the same page that he made these state-
ments, 7 and must have been aware of the use of the word
"stranger" in the context of the writ of prohibition. This is very
persuasive evidence that a "stranger" was not understood to be
one without a personal interest in obtaining a writ of prohibi-
tion.
Other legal writings from eighteenth century England also
support the proposition that the "stranger" who could seek a
writ of prohibition was one with some personal interest in
obtaining the writ, but was not a party in interest in the pro-
ceedings in the inferior court. Indeed, according to Giles Jacob,
the term "stranger" was widely understood to be a term of art,
and had "[In the Law... a special Signification, for him that
is not privy to an Act: As a Stranger to a Judgment, is he to
whom a Judgment doth not belong; and in this Sense it is
directly contrary to Party or Privy."78 "Parties" were defined
as "Persons which are named in a Deed or Fine, viz. that make
the Deed or levy the Fine; and also to whom made and levied.
75 3 BLACKSTONE'S COIMENTARiES, supra note 69, at 113 (first emphasis add-
ed).
71 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMIMENTARIES, supra note 69 (emphasis added). Richard
Burn, another eighteenth century legal scholar, used similar terms to describe the
method of obtaining a writ of prohibition. Burn wrote that "the party aggrieved in
the court below applies to the superior court, setting forth in a suggestion upon
record the nature and cause of his complaint." RICHARD BURN, A NEW LAW DIC-
TIONARY 249 (1792) (emphasis added) [hereinafter BURN'S DICTIONARY].
7 3 BLACKsTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 113.
78 GILEs JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1744) (emphasis in original)
[hereinafter JACOB'S DICTIONARY].
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The Parties to a Suit, are the Plaintiff and Defendant who
carry on the same."79
According to Jacob, a "stranger" was one who had "either a
present or future right; or an apparent possibility of right,
growing afterwards, &c."8' Strangers to deeds could "not take
advantage of conditions of entry, &c. as parties and privies
may; but they are not obliged to make their claims on a Fine
levied until five years."8 ' Thus the "stranger" who could seek
a writ of prohibition was by definition one with "either a pres-
ent or future right," rather than one with no interest whatso-
ever in the particular proceeding in question.
Jacob cited Woods' Institute for the proposition that
strangers were those with "either a present or a future
right,"' and Wood used almost the exact same language to
describe a stranger: "Strangers to Fines are those fhat are
neither Parties nor Privies. Strangers have either a Present or
Future Right; or an apparent Possibility of Right growing after-
wards, or a Right to something Issuing only out of Lands.' s
Strangers who had a present right were "Bound by five Years
after Proclamations, if they make not their Claim, within that
Time," but strangers with "a Future Right, upon a Precedent
Cause, and whose Right and Title cometh to them after the
Proclamations... have five years after the coming of such
Rights to enter and make their claim."' Those who were
strangers with "neither Present nor Future Right, but only a
Possibility at the Time of Levying the Fine, or whose Right
groweth either entirely after the Proclamations, or partly be-
fore and partly after, may Enter and Claim when they
please."86
Similarly, Blackstone stated that "[sitrangers to a fine"
were "all other persons in the world, except only parties and
privies. And these are also bound by a fine, unless, within five
years after proclamations made, they interpose their claim;
7 JACOB'S DICTIONARY, supra note 78.
JACOB'S DICTIONARY, supra note 78 (emphasis in original).
JACOB'S DICTIONARY, supra note 78.
JACOB'S DICTIONARY, supra note 78.
" 2 WOOD'S INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 245 (emphasis in original).
2 WOOD'S INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 245.
2 WOOD'S INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 246 (emphasis in original).
2 WOOD'S INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 246 (emphasis in original).
1997] 1015
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
provided they are under no legal impediments, and have then a
present interest in the estate."87 Numerous other contempora-
neous authorities defined "stranger" in this manner.88 Indeed,
the overwhelming weight of authority supports the proposition
that the "stranger" who was allowed to obtain a writ of prohi-
bition was one who, while not a party or privy to a party, was,
in Bacon's words, "in danger of being injured by some suit
actually depending."
The research of Professor Thio5 also supports the propo-
sition that the "stranger" who could seek a writ of prohibition
was a non-party with some personal interest in obtaining the
writ. According to Thio, the original purpose of the writ of
prohibition "was to confine courts stricto sensu within their
powers."" And, since "implicit in any proceeding before a
court stricto sensu is the existence of a lis, the applicant for an
order of prohibition is invariably a party to the dispute."'
Indeed, after examining all of the cases according "strangers"
standing to seek a writ of prohibition, Thio found only two
cases where the applicant was "completely lacking in interest
in the subject matter of the suit Sought to be prohibited,"2
and in only one of these cases, Worthington v. Jeffries, was the
applicant successful.93 Worthington was not decided until
1875, and thus tells us nothing about the eighteenth century
understanding of a disinterested stranger's ability to obtain a
writ of prohibition.
Furthermore, Thio found cases decided within a decade of
Worthington which, although acknowledging the right of
"strangers" to seek a writ of prohibition, rejected the parties'
claims due to a lack of sufficient interest. Although these cases
87 2 BLACKSTONE'S CONMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 356.
" See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM'S DICTIONARY, supra note 65 (stranger is "directly
contrary to party or privy," as "a stranger to a judgment. . . is he to whom a
judgment: doth not belong"); JOHN COWELL, A LAW DICTIONARY (1672) (same)
[hereinafter COWELL'S DICTIONARY]; THOMAS BLOUNT, A LAW DICTIONARY AND
GLOSSARY (3d ed. 1717) (same) [hereinafter BLOUNT'S DICTIONARY].
" See THIO, supra note 57.
TIO, supra note 57, at 79.
91 THIO, supra note 57, at 79.
TmHO, supra note 57, at 82-83 (citing Worthington v. Jeffries (1875) L.R. 10
C.P. 379; and Chambers v. Green (1875) L.R. 20 Eq. 552).
TIO, supra note 57, at 83 (citing Worthington v. Jeffries (1875) L.R. 10 C.P.
379).
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are not relevant to demonstrate the eighteenth century prac-
tice, they do demonstrate that the holding in Worthington was
not necessarily "the rule of law" as late as 1875. In the first
case, Forster v. Forster and Berridge,' the co-respondent to a
suit for dissolution of a marriage sought a writ of prohibition
against the matrimonial court. A statute required that an
adulterer be made a co-respondent in a suit for divorce in or-
der to pay the costs of the proceedings." According to Thio,
Chief Justice Cockburn "drew a distinction between a stranger
applying for prohibition and an aggrieved party, ruling that
the grant of the remedy is discretionary in the case of the
former, and that it issued ex debito justitiae in the case of the
latter."96
Chief Justice Cockburn's opinion in Forster is revealing as
to whether a disinterested stranger could obtain a writ of pro-
hibition. Cockburn stated that "[t]he applicant, the co-respon-
dent, is a stranger, being aggrieved, on his own shewing, only
in so far as he has been decreed to pay all the costs of the suit,
including those of the wife, in resisting the suit for the dissolu-
tion of the marriage."97 The co-respondent was "only ag-
grieved in respect of being ordered to pay the costs of that
which is the legal ground of complaint,-in all other respects he
is a stranger."8 Cockburn stated that he
entirely concur[s] in the proposition that, although the Court will
listen to a person who is a stranger, and who interferes to point out
that some other Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, whereby some
wrong or grievance has been sustained, yet that is not ex debito
justitiae... as distinguished from the case of a party aggrieved,
who is entitled to relief ex debito justitiae if he suffers from the
usurpation of jurisdiction by another Court.P
Cockburn then rejected the co-respondents application for a
writ of prohibition because "all that the applicant can allege is
" 122 Eng. Rep. 430 (1863).
'4 Id. at 433.
THIO, supra note 57, at 82.
Forster, 122 Eng. Rep. at 434.
"Id. at 435.
Id. (emphasis added).
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that he has been wrongfully ordered to pay these costs."'00 In
other words, not only was the co-respondent deemed a "strang-
er" in spite of the fact that he was clearly "aggrieved" by the
proceedings in the court below, but the degree of injury was
not sufficient for the court to intervene on his behalf.
Cockburn's most illuminating statement was made in
response to one of the attorneys' admonitions that "a prohibi-
tion may be granted upon the request of a stranger, as well as
of the defendant himself."'' Cockburn said that "the appli-
cant would only have a right to get that part of it prohibited in
which he is interested." °2
The opinions of the other judges in Forster also demon-
strate that as late as 1863, a "stranger" needed some signifi-
cant personal interest in order to obtain a writ of prohibition.
Justice Wightman said that he agreed with Chief Justice
Cockburn on "the insufficiency of the" interest of the applicant
in the subject matter to entitle him to make this application
[for a writ of prohibition]. "1"3 Justice Crompton stated that he
agreed "in deciding the case on the narrower ground" that
"[tihe applicant having had costs awarded against him.., and
being an adulterer, has no locus standi to complain of the dis-
solution of the marriage; the only suggestion is, that he is
aggrieved because he is ordered to pay costs. But they are
independent of the dissolution of the marriage."' " Again, the
co-respondent was considered a "stranger," even though ag-
grieved, and did not have a sufficient interest to obtain a writ
of prohibition.
Justice Blackburn stated that he "agree[d] with the Lord
Chief Justice and my brothers Wightman and Cromptom in
thinking this rule should be discharged.""°5 According to
Blackburn, "[plrohibition is granted for two reasons."' The
first is "contempt of the Crown," and the second "a damage to
the party."' 7 Where there has been contempt of the crown,
1oo Id.
101 Id. at 434.
"o Forster, 122 Eng. Rep. at 434.
103 Id.
104 Id.
'0' Id. at 436.
106 Id.
" Forster, 122 Eng. Rep. at 436.
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"that is a case in which we ought to interfere.""3 But, accord-
ing to Blackburn, "[a] stranger has in general no right to re-
quire our interference; but if he shews that he is aggrieved and
has sustained damage, then, ex debito justitiae, as in any other
suit, he has a right to our opinion upon the question."'c The
application by this stranger was rejected because the co-re-
spondent was not "in any sense a party aggrieved by an excess
of jurisdiction .... He has no interest in the question whether
the marriage is to stand or not."' The effect of this case, ac-
cording to Thio, is "to limit the term 'aggrieved party' to either
the plaintiff or defendant in a suit, and to designate a non-
party applicant for prohibition a 'stranger.' "M'
Thio also found support for this view of "stranger" stand-
ing in Chief Justice Cockburn's opinion in Rex v. Twiss,12 a
case decided a year before Worthington. Twiss, according to
Thio, arose "out of an application by the guardians of the poor
of a parish for a license to apply consecrated grounds for secu-
lar purposes."" 3 A writ of prohibition was sought by "[a] non-
resident of the parish... to prevent the licensing authority
from proceeding with the application made by the guardians of
the poor."114 Chief Justice Cockburn stated that the prohibi-
tion in this case would not be granted based on
the distinction which was much relied on by my Brother Blackburn
as well as myself in Forster v. Forster, viz., that in the exercise of
this jurisdiction by prohibition, the Court will not interfere on the
application of a person who is a stranger, and not in any way inter-
ested in the subject matter of the suit sought to be prohibited, nor
aggrieved by the alleged excess ofjurisdiction."'
Because the applicant had not shown " 'any interest in the
preservation of the churchyard, he must be taken, therefore to
have come here to try the abstract question whether a church-
yard once consecrated can be applied to secular purposes.' ""16
108 1&
SId. (emphasis added).
110 Id.
. THIO, supra note 57, at 82.
112 (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 407.
11 THIO, supra note 57, at 84.
114 TIO, supra note 57, at 84.
's Twiss, [1869] L.R. 4 Q.B. at 413.
n6 Id. at 413-14.
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Indeed, Professor Thio was unable to find a single case
from the eighteenth century wherein a disinterested stranger
obtained a writ of prohibition, and only one 1875 case,
Worthington v. Jeffries, wherein such an applicant was suc-
cessful. Cases decided within a decade of Worthington, howev-
er, continued to require a significant personal interest. More-
over, Professors Jaffe and Berger failed to cite a single case
from that period for such a proposition. As the court stated in
Worthington, "[tihe absence of any instance of the exercise of
the suggested right is the strongest evidence against its exis-
tence."117
On the other hand, authoritative statements from Wood,
Bacon, Blackstone, and others demonstrate that "the business
of the... courts of Westminster when the Constitution was
framed""' did not include issuing writs of prohibition on be-
half of strangers lacking any personal interest in stopping the
proceedings in the inferior court. Indeed, it appears that those
seeking to rely on the eighteenth century understanding of the
writ of prohibition to disprove Justice Scalia's assertion that
standing has "deep roots in the common law understanding...
of what makes a matter appropriate for judicial disposi-
tion""' would do well to take a second look at the writings of
that period.
II. THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Berger and Jaffe also cited certiorari as a writ which could
be obtained by a mere "stranger" in the English courts of the
eighteenth century. Berger first cited two cases, one from 1870
and the other from 1924, which discuss the similarities be-
tween the writs of prohibition and certiorari, 20 and another
case from 1702 wherein Chief Justice Holt stated that certiora-
ri would issue to review the " 'proceedings of all jurisdictions
erected by Act of Parliament... to the end that this court may
.. Worthington v. Jeffries, [1875] L.R. 10 C.P. at 385.
.. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (Franlkfurt-
er, J., concurring).
119 Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 339 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 Berger, supra note 17, at 820 (quoting The Queen v. Justices of Surrey,
[1870] L.R. 5 Q.B. 466, 472-73; and The King v. Electricity Commissioners, [1924]
1 K.B. 171, 204-05).
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see that they keep themselves within their jurisdiction; and if
they exceed it, to restrain them.' ""
However, Berger cited only two English cases for the prop-
osition that a "stranger" could seek a writ of certiorari. ' The
first case, Regina v. Thames Magistrates Court, ex parte
Greenbaum, tells us nothing about the English practice in
certiorari during the eighteenth century, as it was not decided
until 1957. The second case, The Queen v. The Justices of Sur-
rey, suffers from the same flaw, having been decided in 1870,
although it is a bit more relevant than the first. Surrey, how-
ever, is afflicted with problems independent of its age. The
court in Surrey relied on Forster v. Forster and Berridge' for
the proposition that a "stranger" seeking a writ of prohibition
was one "having no particular interest in the matter." '
However, as was demonstrated by the opinions of the justices
in Forster' and by Professor Thio,'= Forster does not
stand for the proposition that one with no interest could seek a
writ of prohibition. Indeed, the court in Forster referred to the
applicant as a "stranger," although he was clearly "aggrieved,"
and proceeded to deny him a writ of prohibition due to the
insufficiency of his interest,' suggesting that not only was
one required to have some interest, but that the interest had to
be significant.
Furthermore, the Surrey court relied on Arthur v. Commis-
sioner of Sewers' for the distinction between an "application
by a party aggrieved and by one who comes merely as a
stranger to inform the Court."' Berger also cited Arthur as
a case from which the proposition that "certiorari was avail-
able to a stranger may be inferred,"" because the court
' Id (quoting Rex v. Inhabitants in Glamorganshire, 91 Eng. Rep. 1287, 1288
(1702)).
SId at 821 (citing Regina v. Thames Magistrates Court, ex parte Grcenbaum
[19571 Local Gov't Rep. 129, 132, 135-36; and Regina v. Justices of Surrey, [1870]
L.R. 5 Q.B. 466, 472-73).
122 Eng. Rep. 430 (1863).
Surrey, 5 Q.B. at 473. See also THIO, supra note 57, at 92.
L See discussion supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
THIO, supra note 57, at 82, 92.
' See Forster, 122 Eng. Rep. at 435.
88 Eng. Rep. 237 (1725).
Surrey, 5 Q.B. at 473. See also Tmo, supra note 57, at 92.
Berger, supra note 17, at 820 (citing Arthur v. Commissioner of Sewers, 88
Eng. Rep. 237 (1725)).
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"drew a distinction between a party aggrieved and 'one who
comes merely as a stranger,' for purposes of deciding whether
issuance of the writ was discretionary or a matter of right."13 1
The opinion of the court in Arthur, however, does not even con-
tain the word "stranger."
In Arthur, the plaintiff had been chosen as clerk at a
meeting of the commissioners, and at the next meeting they
fired him.'32 The clerk moved for a writ of certiorari, which
was opposed by the commissioners "who offered to read affida-
vits that the plaintiff was surreptitiously chosen without due
notice given to the majority of the commissioners."' 3' The
plaintiff responded that the court should "not inquire into the
merits of his election until a certiorari was granted and re-
turned."" The court apparently agreed, as the reporter
wrote that "for this reason the Court would not permit the affi-
davits to be read, but would grant a certiorari, which was a
writ of right."'3 5 The reporter then noted that "this was de-
nied by one of the Judges, who said that a certiorari was not a
writ of right, for if it was it could never be denied to grant it;
but it has often been denied by this Court... so that it is not
always a writ of right."'36 That same judge went on to say
that
[lilt is true, where a man is chosen into an office or place, by virtue
whereof he has a temporal right, and is deprived thereof by an infe-
rior jurisdiction, who proceed in a summary way, in such case he is
entitled to a certiorari ex debito justitiae, because he has no other
remedy, being bound by the judgment of the inferior judicature.1"7
Conspicuously missing from Arthur is the standing of a
"stranger" as opposed to the standing of an "aggrieved par-
ty."38 Apparently one judge thought that a person who had
been summarily deprived of an "office or place" was entitled to
a writ of certiorari ex debito justitiae. But that says little, if
11 Id. at 821.
Arthur, 88 Eng. Rep. at 237.
13 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
134 Id.
Arthur, 88 Eng. Rep. at 237.
z Cf. TIHO, supra note 57, at 92 ("[I]t is noteworthy that the court made no
reference to the capacity of a person who is not aggrieved to apply for certiorari.").
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anything, about the ability of one with no personal interest in
the proceedings to obtain a writ of certiorari. It means at most
that this particular judge thought that this particular ag-
grieved person, who had been summarily deprived of his office,
was entitled to the writ as a matter of right.
Another problem with Surrey is that the court (erroneous-
ly) relied on the case of The Queen v. Newborough" for the
proposition that when a stranger or "one of the general public
having no particular interest in the matter" seeks a writ of
certiorari, "the Court has a discretion."' The standing of the
parties seeking the certiorari in Newborough was never even
mentioned by the court or the parties in that case.
In Newborough, special constables were appointed by the
justices of the peace "in apprehension of expected disturbances
at the parliamentary elections which were then about to take
place."' Later, the justices "made an order for the payment
of 951. Is. 3d. on account of allowances to, and expenses in-
curred in respect of, special constables." "' The payment was
allowed and "two ratepayers then objected to such allowance
and requested the Court to disallow the same.""' The court's
opinion contains no discussion of certiorari or the ability of
disinterested members of the public to seek the writ. The Sur-
rey court relied on this single sentence from the Newborough
opinion: "It is in the discretion of the Court to grant or to re-
fuse a certiorari, and it is not a matter of right."'" However,
as Professor Thio states, the Newborough court "might well
have regarded the ratepayers aggrieved persons as did subse-
quent courts in certiorari applications.""
5
Professor Jaffe cited the work of Professor de Smith for the
proposition that the "English tradition of locus standi in...
certiorari is that a 'stranger' has standing, but relief in suits
by strangers is discretionary.""6 Professor de Smith was,
however, much more tentative with his conclusions than either
[1869] L.& 4 Q.B. 585.
Surrey, 5 Q.B. at 473. See also THIO, supra note 57, at 93.
" Newborough, at 585.
M Id. at 586.
143 Id.
Id at 589.
1 TRIO, supra note 57, at 93.
"'Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1274 (citing DE SMITH, supra note 56, at 308).
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Jaffe or Berger.47 Professor de Smith stated that "[tihere are
numerous dicta to the effect that a 'stranger' may be awarded
a certiorari,"' but "there is no reason for doubting the
soundness of Lord Denning's observation that the court
" 'would not listen, of course, to a mere busybody who was in-
terfering in things which did not concern him.' "1" However,
the most interesting conclusion reached by Professor de Smith
is that "in no reported English case has an application brought
by such a person been successful."50 It is also noteworthy
that the earliest case found by de Smith which actually states
the proposition that an unaggrieved "stranger" could obtain a
writ of certiorari is the 1870 case of The Queen v. The Justices
of Surrey,5' one of the two cases cited by Professor Berger for
this same proposition.
In summary, neither Professor Berger nor Professor Jaffe
cited any persuasive evidence that the certiorari practice in the
courts of Westminster at the time the Constitution was framed
included granting the writ to disinterested strangers. Aside
from the "inference" Berger drew from the 1725 decision in
Arthur v. Commissioner of Sewers, which inference we have
seen was unwarranted, Berger's argument is based entirely on
a very questionable decision from 1870, and a decision from
1957, neither of which reveals anything about the contempo-
rary understanding of the judicial power in 1789. Professor
Jaffe relied solely on the research of Professor de Smith, who
was himself quite tentative in his conclusions about the Eng-
lish tradition in certiorari. Indeed, Professor de Smith himself
did not cite a single eighteenth century source for the proposi-
tion that a disinterested stranger could obtain a writ of certio-
rari, and the earliest court decision he did cite is the same
1870 decision cited by Professor Berger, The Queen v. The
Justices of Surrey.
17 "[Mlost of the decisions have failed to provide a full exposition of the rele-
vant legal principles and many of the dicta are ambiguous." DE SMITH, supra note
56, at 368.
14 DE SMITH, supra note 55, at 369.
... DE SMITH, supra note 55, at 369 (quoting R. v. Paddington Valuation Officer,
ex p. Peachey Property Corporation Ltd. [19661 1 Q.B. 380, 401).
1"' DE SMITH, supra note 55, at 369.
..1 Surrey, 5 Q.B. at 466.
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The legal writings of eighteenth century England, on the
other hand, reveal that at the time the Constitution was
framed the writ of certiorari was available only to parties ag-
grieved by the action of the court below. Bacon described cer-
tiorari as
an original Writ issuing out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, di-
rected in the King's Name, to the Judges or Officers of (a) Inferior
Courts, commanding them to return the Records of a Cause depend-
ing before them; to the End the Party may have the more sure and
speedy Justice before him15 2
As the King's Bench had "a Superintendency over all Courts of
an Inferior Criminal Jurisdiction," according to Bacon, it could
have "any Indictment removed and brought before it self.""a
Moreover, when the writ was sought by the king it was grant-
ed as a matter of right, since "he has a Prerogative of Suing in
what Court he pleases."' However, the court had "a Discre-
tionary Power in granting or refusing it at the Suit of the De-
fendant.""' Bacon never suggested that anyone but the pros-
ecutor or the defendant could remove a criminal indictment by
writ of certiorari, nor did he mention the word "stranger."
Statements by other commentators of the eighteenth cen-
tury also suggest that only the prosecutor or a defendant could
obtain a writ of certiorari. Cowell described the writ of certio-
rari as "a Writ... to an inferior Court, to call up the Records
of a Cause therein depending, that conscionable Justice may be
therein administered, upon Complaint made by Bill, that the
Party which seeketh the said Writ, had receiv'd hard dealing in
the said Courts." 6 Any party who had "receiv'd hard dealing"
' 1 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 349 (emphasis added).
1 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 349-50.
15 1 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 350.
15 1 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 350.
154 COWELL'S DICTIONARY, supra note 88, at CE. See also BLOUNTS DICTIOARY,
supra note 88, at CE (Certiorari is a writ issuing 'to an inferior Court, to call up
the Records of a Cause there depending, that Justice may be done therein, upon
complaint made by Bill, that the Party who seeks the said Writ, hath received hard
dealing in the said Court") (emphasis added). A "bill' in this context was "a Decla-
ration in Writing, expressing either the Wrong the Complainant hath suffered by
the Party complained of, or else some Fault committed against some Law or Stat-
ute of the Realm .... It contains the fact complained of, the Damage thereby
sustained, and Petition of Process against the Defendant for redress. JACOB'S
DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at BI (emphasis added).
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in the court below can hardly be thought of as a disinterested
stranger.
Similarly, Jacob described certiorari as a writ issuing out
of the King's Bench or Chancery "to an inferior Court, to call
up the Records of a Cause there depending, that Justice may
be done therein, upon Complaint that the Party who seeks the
said Writ hath received hard Usage, or is not like to have an
indifferent Trial in the said Court."5 ' Furthermore, Jacob
said that when the writ was "at the Suit of the King, the Court
is bound to award it .... But it is at the Discretion of the
Court to grant it or not, at the Prayer of the Defendant.""8
Jacob did not mention a disinterested "stranger" obtaining a
writ of certiorari. 59
William Hawkins wrote in his treatise that the King's
Bench or Chancery court could "award a Certiorari ... to re-
move the Proceedings before" the other "Courts of Criminal
Jurisdiction, whether they be of ancient or newly created Ju-
risdiction."6 ' The court was "bound of Right to award it at
the Instance of the King .... But it seems to be agreed, That
it is left to the Discretion of the Court either to grant or deny
it at the prayer of the Defendant." 6' Again, nothing was said
of the ability of a "stranger" to obtain the writ.
Similarly, William Rastal described the writ of certiorari
as "a Writ that lies where a Man is impleaded in a base Court,
that is of Record, and he supposes that he may not have equal
Justice there."6' The writ would also lie "in many other Cas-
es, to remove Records for the King, as Indictments and oth-
ers."" And, "upon Writs of Error of Judgment in the Com-
mon Pleas, each Party may have this Writ to bring any of the
... JACOB'S DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at CE.
... Id. See also The King v. Eaton, 100 Eng. Rep. 49 (1787) ("The language of
the Court has always been, that the King has a right to remove proceedings by
certiorari of course; but that where a defendant makes an application of this sort,
he must always lay a ground for it before the Court.").
,9 Cf CUNNINGHAM'S DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at CER ("But though the
court is to grant it at the suit of the King, yet it has a discretionary power in
granting or refusing it at the suit of the defendant.").
160 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CRovN 286 (1721).
161 Id. at 287.
162 WILLIAM RASTAL, LES TERMES DE LA LEY 106 (1721).
1 Id. at 106-07.
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proceedings into the King's Bench."1 Burns described the
writ as "issuing out of the court of chancery or of the king's
bench... commanding them to certify or return the records of
a cause depending before them, to the end the party may have
the more sure and speedy justice.""s
Blackstone's writings also demonstrate that the writ of
certiorari was available only to the parties in the proceedings
below. Blackstone stated that the King's Bench was
divided into a crown side, and a plea side. And on the crown side, or
crown office, it takes cognizance of all criminal causes .... Into this
court also indictments from all inferior courts may be removed by
writ of certiorari, and tried either at bar, or at nisi prius, by a jury
of the county out of which the indictment is brought.c :
The writ of certiorari facias was, according to Blackstone, "had
at any time before trial, to certify and remove the indictment;
with all the proceedings thereon, from any inferior court of
criminal jurisdiction."" Certiorari was "granted at the in-
stance of either the prosecutor or the defendant: the former as a
matter of right, the latter as a matter of discretion."1" Accord-
ing to Blackstone, this was done "frequently" for one of four
purposes:
1. To consider and determine the validity of appeals or indictments
and the proceedings thereon; and to quash or confirm them as there
is cause: or, 2. Where it is surmised that a partial or insufficient
trial will probably be had in the court below, the indictment is re-
moved, in order to have the prisoner or defendant tried at the bar of
the court of king's bench, or before the justices of nisi prius: or, 3. It
is so removed, in order to plead the king's pardon there: or, 4. To
issue process of outlawry against the offender, in those counties or
places where the process of the inferior judges will not reach
him.163
Once the writ was issued and delivered to the inferior court
"for removing any record or other proceeding, as well as upon
indictment as otherwise, [it] supersedes the jurisdiction of such
inferior court, and makes all subsequent proceedings therein
1" Id. at 107.
16 BURN'S DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 149.
164 4 BLACKSToNE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 262 (emphasis in original).
117 4 BLAcKSToNE'S ComMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 315.
1 4 BLACKsTONE's COmMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 316 (emphasis added).
16 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMIENTARIES, supra note 69, at 315.
1997] 1027/
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
entirely erroneous and illegal."7 ° Blackstone's description of
the writ clearly suggests that it was available only at the suit
of the prosecutor or the defendant. Nowhere is there any lan-
guage to suggest that a disinterested stranger could obtain
such a writ.
Matthew Hale described the writ of certiorari as one which
issued "unto inferior justices to remove indictments or appeals"
to the king's bench, as it was "the sovereign ordinary court of
justice in causes criminal." 7' The writ issued:
to consider and determine the validity of indictments,.., to have
the prisoner or offender tried either at the bar, or by nisi prius be-
fore the king's justices of the courts of Westminster... to examine,
and affirm or reverse the proceedings and judgments given by inferi-
or judges,... to plead the king's pardon... for] to issue process of
outlawry against the offender in those counties and places where the
process of inferior justices cannot reach them.'
Hale never used the word "stranger," nor did he suggest that a
disinterested person could obtain the writ of certiorari.
In fact, a thorough review of the writings of a host of legal
scholars of the period uncovered only one statement in
Hawkins' treatise which suggests that the writ of certiorari
was available to a "stranger," although a closer look at the
reference reveals that the "stranger" was, like the stranger
who could obtain a writ of prohibition, one with some interest
in the relief sought. The statement is found in the section of
Hawkins' treatise entitled "Of Appeals," where he was discuss-
ing the abatement of an appeal "upon the Exception or Plea of
the Party for the Multiplicity of Action."'
An "appeal" in this context was "an Accusation of One
against another to Attaint Him of Felony by Words Ordain'd
for it."'74 It was "always at the Suit of the Subject. It is the
Party's Private Action, prosecuting also for the Crown in re-
spect of the Felony."'75 The "Appellant" was the plaintiff and
the "Appellee" was the defendant.'76 Hawkins wrote that
170 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 316.
171 2 MATrHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE 210 (1788).
17 Id.
" 2 HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 190.
'u 4 WOOD'S INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 627.
175 4 WooD's INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 627.
176 4 WOOD'S INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 627.
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after an Appellant hath appeared on a Writ of Appeal, or even on a
Bill of Appeal removed into the Court of King's-Bench from before
the Sheriff and Coroners by Certiorari, if he commences a new Ap-
peal for the same Matter, the Appellee may plead in Abatement that
such prior Appeal is still depending, &c.'
However, it was "no Plea in Abatement of a Writ of Appeal,
that the Appellant hath brought a Bill of Appeal for the same
Matter before the Sheriff and Coroners, because such Bill is
not of so high a Nature as a Writ of Appeal... till it be re-
moved into the King's Bench."17 Once the bill was removed
into the King's Bench, however, "if the Plaintiff bring a Writ of
Appeal for the same Matter... the Appellee may plead in
Abatement that such Bill of Appeal is depending, because after
it is removed into the King's-Bench, it is of as high a Nature as
a Writ of Appeal."
Hawkins then made the following statement:
Yet Sir Matthew Hale seems to be of the Opinion that such Bill so
removed is not pleadable in Abatement 'til the Plaintiff hath ap-
peared thereon; perhaps for this Reason, that before the Plaintiff
hath appeared it doth not appear of Record that he hath prosecuted
the Suit in the King's Court, because the Certiorari might have been
taken out by a Stranger. Upon which Ground it seems to have been
resolved that it is no good Plea in Abatement of an Appeal, that the
Plaintiff hath purchased another Writ of Appeal... because it
might be for what appears upon the Record, That the first Appeal
was so far prosecuted by a Stranger, but in the same Case it is ad-
mitted that such prior Appeal depending will abate the second,
where it appears on Record that the same Plaintiff hath appeared
and sued it, as in praying of Process, &c.'
Although this quote clearly suggests that a "stranger" might
have prosecuted the appeal and obtained a writ of certiorari in
the King's Bench, the context of the reference makes it clear
that Hawkins was not referring to one with no interest in the
appeal, because Hawkins had just spent several pages demon-
strating exactly who had a sufficient legal interest to appeal
certain felonies. For example, according to Hawkins, a wife
1 HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 190.
*" HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 190. A statute provided that all of the appeals
filed before the Sheriff and Coroner in the County Court could be "[riemoved by
Certiorari into the King's Bench." 4 WOOD'S INSTITUTE, supra note 60, at 628.
17 HAW; S, supra note 160, at 190.
HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 190.
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could appeal the death of her husband, but only if she proved
"that she was wholly innocent herself of the Death complained
of," and that "she was the Lawful Wife of the Deceased, at the
time of his Death."'8' Furthermore, "if the Wife herself had a
share in the Guilt, the Heir may have an Appeal against
her."18 However, the heir had to be an heir "general to the
deceased, by the Course of the Common Law."1" If the "Heir
general had himself a share in the Guilt... the next Heir
shall have an Appeal against him."' However, a father
could not "have an Appeal of the Death of his Son, because he
cannot be his Heir."' 85
To appeal a larceny, Hawkins wrote, it was not absolutely
necessary "that the Appellant have the absolute Property of
the Goods stoln [sic]; for it seems agreed that a Carrier or even
a Servant... may have an Appeal of Larceny against any one
who shall steal them."88 However, one could not "maintain
such an Appeal who has the bare Charge of Goods without a
Possession."8 7 In short, it is unclear exactly what Hawkins
was referring to when he used the term "stranger" in this
context, but these passages reveal that he was not referring to
one with no interest in prosecuting the appeal.
The portion of Hale's treatise cited by Hawkins does not
mention the writ of certiorari, but is nevertheless revealing.
Hale was discussing when a man should "be put to answer in
criminal and capital offenses without indictment at the king's
suit.""' One such instance was where an appeal was
"brought at the suit of the party, and the plaintiff is nonsuit
upon that appeal."89 In that situation, Hale wrote, "the of-
fender shall be arraigned at the king's suit upon such ap-
peal."9 ' But there were two limitations on this type of action
by the king. First, such an appeal by the king could only occur
"where the plaintiff in appeal hath either declared upon his
... HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 163.
' HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 165.
18 HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 165.
1 HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 165.
1 HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 165.
' HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 167.
. HAWKINS, supra note 160, at 167.
1 2 HALE, supra note 171, at 155 (italics omitted).
115 2 HALE, supra note 171, at 156.
"0 2 HALE, supra note 171, at 156.
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appeal by writ, or formed his appeal by bill, for the bare issu-ing of a writ [of appeal] without a declaration is not such an
appeal as, the party being nonsuit, the defendant shall be
thereupon arraigned." 9' This requirement was based in part
on the fact that the writ of appeal might have been "brought in
his name by a stranger without his privity." Thus the
"stranger" Hawkins was referring to was, according to Hale,
one attempting to bring the appeal in the name of the injured
party. This could be interpreted to mean that the term "strang-
er" was being used as it was in the context of the writ of prohi-
bition, to refer to one who is not a named party to the suit.
The second limitation on this type of appeal by the king is
also revealing. Hale said that for the king to proceed on the
appeal it must have been "an appeal.., well begun, and by a
party enabled to prosecute it. " " Thus if the appeal abated
"because a plaintiff is outlawed, or a woman (who cannot bring
an appeal, but only of the death of her husband,)... there the
appeal shall not be arraigned at the king's suit, because the
appeal was never good."'
The most significant problem, however, with the notion
that a disinterested "stranger" could obtain the writ of certiora-
ri in the English Courts of the eighteenth century is that such
a proposition is not to be found in any authoritative legal
sources from that period. Although there are many authorita-
tive assertions that a "stranger" could obtain the writ of prohi-
bition, none have been found in discussions of the writ of cer-
tiorari. And although Hawkins and Hale, while discussing the
abatement of appeals, at least implied that a "stranger" might
have sought a writ of certiorari, the references are at best
ambiguous. Moreover, in his discussion of the writ of certiorari,
Hawkins never mentioned the word stranger, and never sug-
gested that anyone other than the prosecutor or defendant (or
one in privity to the prosecutor or defendant) could obtain such
a writ.9
5
Furthermore, even if we assume arguendo that a "strang-
er" could obtain the writ of certiorari in the English courts of
191 2 HALE, supra note 171, at 156.
"' 2 HALE, supra note 171, at 156.
19 2 HALE, supra note 171, at 149.
"' 2 HALE, supra note 171, at 149.
19 See HAVWINS, supra note 160, at 286.
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the eighteenth century, it has already been demonstrated that
the term "stranger" was a term of art used to refer to one who
was not a plaintiff or defendant (or one privy to the plaintiff or
defendant) in the relevant proceedings, but who nevertheless
had some personal interest in the relief sought.19 There is
simply no authority before the 1870 decision in The Queen v.
The Justices of Surrey'97 for the notion that the disinterested
"stranger" could obtain the writ of prohibition.
In sum, the English practice in certiorari during the eigh-
teenth century did not, as was suggested by Berger and Jaffe,
allow "one without a 'personal stake,' a mere stranger to the
action complained of... to initiate and maintain an
'adversary' proceeding in the public interest to challenge a
jurisdictional usurpation."98 Those who rely on the eigh-
teenth century practice in certiorari to accuse Justice Scalia
and others of "ignoring history," and creating "new traditions"
would do well to take a second look at that history and tradi-
tion themselves. Indeed it appears that the eighteenth century
English practice is consistent with Justice Scalia's assertion
that the "personal stake" requirement of the standing doctrine
is grounded "upon common understanding of what activities
are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to
courts."9 9
III. THE INFORMATION IN THE NATURE OF Quo WARRANTO
Professor Berger also cited the "information in the nature
of quo warranto" as an eighteenth century writ which was
available to the disinterested "stranger.""0 Professor Berger
wrote that the quo warranto information "antedates the stat-
ute of 9 Anne, which allowed anyone who so desired to make
use of the name of the Clerk of the Crown, with leave of Court,
for the purpose of prosecuting usurpers of franchises." 20 1 "The
breadth of the statute envisaged suits by a stranger," according
"' See discussion supra notes 66-119.
19 [18701 L.R. 5 Q.B. 466.
19 Berger, supra note 17, at 827.
19 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
2 Berger, supra note 17, at 823. Professor Jaffe did not refer to the informa-
tion in the nature of quo warranto.
201 Berger, supra note 17, at 823.
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to Berger, "and at least one case in 1789 held that the writ
was available to a stranger, as had earlier been held with
respect to other prerogative vits."I22
There are two immediate problems with Professor Berger's
analysis of the information in the nature of quo warranto. The
first is his assertion that the "breadth of the statute envisaged
suits by a stranger." The relevant starting point, it seems, for
determining what the statute "envisaged" is the statute itself,
which does not contain the word "stranger." Second, the
case Berger cited as holding that "the writ was available to a
stranger" does not mention the availability of the writ to
"strangers."' Apart from these two problems with Berger's
analysis, there is another more fundamental flaw in his reli-
ance on the information in the nature of quo warranto to sup-
port the proposition that "disinterested strangers" could obtain
prerogative writs in the English courts of the eighteenth centu-
ry. Authoritative legal writings from that period suggest that
quo warranto informations, which were a variety of the general
criminal information, were not generally understood to be
available to "disinterested strangers" asserting no interest in
the relief sought. Rather, such informations, which were
brought by a relator in the name of the king, were understood
to be the king's suit. Thus, the extent to which a relator was
interested in the relief sought is, for our purposes, irrelevant.
A. The Criminal Information Generally
The information in the nature of quo warranto was a type
of criminal information, and the criminal information was,
according to Blackstone, "the only species of proceeding at the
suit of the king, without a previous indictment or presentment
by a grand jury.""5 Blackstone described two variations of
the criminal information."6 The first, which is not particular-
ly relevant here, was the information "partly at the suit of the
Berger, supra note 17, at 823.
20 See 9 Anne c. 20 (1710).
204 See Rex v. Smith, 100 Eng. Rep. 740 (1790). See also discussion, infra note
235 and accompanying text.
205 4 BLACKSTONE'S COmMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 303 (emphasis added).
204 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supr note 69, at 303. See also 4 WOOD'S
INSTrrUTE, supra note 60, at 630.
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king, and partly at that of a subject.""7 These informations
were, according to Blackstone, "usually brought upon penal
statutes, which inflict a penalty upon conviction of the offend-
er, one part to the use of the king, and another to the use of
the informer." 8 According to Blackstone, these informations
were "a sort of qui tam action... only carried on by a criminal
instead of a civil process." 9 According to Bacon, qui tam ac-
tions were "such as are given by Acts of Parliament, which
give a Penalty, and create a Forfeiture for the Neglect of some
Duty or Commission of some Crime, to be recovered by Action
or Information, at the Suit of him who prosecutes as well in
the King's Name as in his own."210
The second type of criminal information described by
Blackstone was the information which was "only in the name
of the king,"21' and there were two variations of this type of
information. First, there were those informations which were
"truly and properly his own fruits, and filed ex officio by his
own immediate officer, the attorney general."12 Bacon wrote
that these informations could "be filed without any Application
or Leave of the Court, and the Party shall be obliged to answer
the same."2 ' These ex officio informations were, according to
Blackstone, brought for those crimes which were "such enor-
mous misdemeanors, as peculiarly tend to disturb or endanger
his government, or to molest or affront him in the regular
discharge of his royal functions."214 Bacon described these of-
fenses as those which were "principally and more immediately
against the King."1 5
The second type of information brought "only in the name
of the king" was the information "in which, though the king is
217 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARiES, supra note 69, at 303.
2 4 BLACKSTONE's COMMENTARIEs, supra note 69, at 303.
209 4 BLACKsToNE'S CoMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 303. (emphasis in origi-
nal). A qui tam was "when an Information is exhibited against any Person on a
Penal Statute, at the Suit of the King and the Party who is Informer, where the
Penalty for Breach of the Statute is to be divided between them." JACOB'S DICTIO-
NARY, supra note 78, at QI.
210 1 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 37.
211 4 BLAcKsToNE'S COMIENTARIES, supra note 69, at 303.
212 4 BLAcKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 304.
213 3 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 165.
214 4 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 304.
215 3 BACON'S ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 165.
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the nominal prosecutor, yet it is at the relation of some private
person or common informer." 16 These informations were, ac-
cording to Blackstone, "filed by the king's coroner and attorney
in the court of the king's bench, usually called the master of
the crown-office, who is for this purpose the standing officer of
the public,"217 and were used to prosecute "gross and notori-
ous misdemeanors, riots, batteries, libels, and other immorali-
ties of an atrocious kind, not peculiarly tending to disturb the
government."218 The procedure in such actions was "for the
party grieved to move the court of queen's bench for a rule to
show cause why a criminal information should not be
filed."2' This type of information will be referred to as the
"relator action," and the information in the nature of quo war-
ranto was "one species of such information."z0 Thus, the quo
warranto information, as a "relator action," was generally
understood to be an action "at the suit of the king." A closer
look at the quo warranto information and its development will
be helpful.
B. The Quo Warranto Information
The information in the nature of quo warranto was de-
scribed by Blackstone as "a remedy given to the crown against
such as had usurped or intruded into any office or fran-
chise." 1 The information "tend[ed] to the same purpose as
the ancient writ, being generally made use of to try the civil
rights of such franchises. " ' This "ancient writ," according to
Blackstone, was the "writ of quo warranto," which was "in the
nature of a writ of right for the King against him who claims
or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what
authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the
right."' Where judgment was for the defendant, he would
216 4 BLACKSTONE'S COmMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 304.
217 4 BLACKSTONE'S CObMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 304. See also 3 BACON'S
ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 165.
2' 4 BLACKTONE'S COmENTARmS, supra note 69, at 304-05.
21 4 HENRY JOHN STEPHEN, NEW CO=MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
379 n.(t) (1845).
= Id-
= Id
2 Id at 308.
= 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMIENTARIES, supra note 69, at 262. A "franchise was
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"have allowance of his franchise."2" But where the judgment
was for the king, the franchise was "either seized into the
king's hands, to be granted out again to whomever he shall
please; or, if it be not such a franchise as may subsist in the
hand of the crown, there is merely judgment of ouster, to turn
out the party who usurped it."2"
The writ of quo warranto, Blackstone wrote, eventually fell
into disuse and was replaced by the information in the nature
of quo warranto."2 6 This information was "filed in the court of
king's bench by the attorney general, in the nature of a writ of
quo warranto; wherein the process is speedier."22 ' In other
words, the quo warranto information was initially an ex officio
information, and was, according to Blackstone, "properly a
criminal method of prosecution, as well as to punish the usurp-
er by a fine.., as to oust him, or to seize it for the crown."228
But it was long used as well for "the mere purposes of trying
the civil right, seizing the franchise, or ousting the wrongful
possessor," the fine being nominal only. 29
The quo warranto information eventually became used for
"the decision of corporation disputes between party and party,
without any intervention of the prerogative, by virtue of the
statute 9 Ann. c. 2 0." "° This statute allowed "an information
in the nature of quo warranto to be brought with leave of the
court, at the relation of any person desiring to prosecute the
defined as
a Royal Privilege in the Hands of a Subject; and may be vested in Bod-
ies Politick or Corporations, either aggregate or sole, or in many Persons
that are not Corporations, (as in Borough Towns, &c.) or in a single Per-
son. ... All Franchises and Liberties are derived from the Crown, and
some are held by Charter; but some lie in Prescription and Usage, with-
out the Help of any Charter.
JACOB'S DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at FR. A "liberty" was "a Privilege
held by Grant o[r] Prescription, whereby Men enjoy some Benefit or Fa-
vor beyond the ordinary Subject."
BLOUNT'S DICTIONARY, supra note 88, at LL
" 3 BLACKSTONE'S COADMARIES, supra note 69, at 263.
3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 263 (emphasis in original).
226 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 263.
22 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMAENTARIES, supra note 69, at 263.
22 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 263.
22 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMIENTARIES, supra note 69, at 263.
=' 3 BLACKSTONE'S COIENTARIES, supra note 69, at 264.
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same," which person was then called the "relator." The in-
formation would lie against "any person usurping, intruding
into, or unlawfully holding any franchise or office in any city,
borough, or town corporate," 2 and the relator was required
"to pay or receive costs according to the event of the suit.'f
The purpose of the statute of 9 Anne c. 20 thus appears to
have been to allow the information in the nature of quo war-
ranto, previously an ex officio information available only to the
attorney general, to be pursued as other "relator actions," filed
in the king's name by the king's attorney in the King's Bench,
the master of the crown office.' The fatal flaw in Professor
Berger's reliance upon the quo warranto information is, there-
fore, readily apparent: at the time the United States Constitu-
tion was framed, the information in the nature of quo warran-
to, as a relator action, was understood to be the suit of the
king, brought in the name of the king by the master of the
crown office. Whether the relator in such actions had an inter-
est in the proceedings sufficient to give him "standing" to sue,
21 3 BLACKMSONE'S COMIENTARIES, supra note 69, at 264.
2 3 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 264.
22 3 BLACKMONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 264.
' See Rex v. Trelawney, 97 Eng. Rep. 1010 (1765) (The statute 9 Anne. c. 20
"lets in everybody who desires it, to make use of [the King's] name in prosecuting
usurpers of franchises; whereas, before no subject could haue done so.'). A closer
look at the statute will be helpful The introduction of the statute states that it
was an "Act for rendering the proceedings upon Writs of Mandamus and
Informations in the Nature of a Quo Warranto more speedy and effectual and for
the more easy trying and determining the Rights of Offices and Franchises in
Corporations and Boroughs." 9 Anne c. 20 (1710). The statute was enacted to
assist divers Persons who had a Right to such Offices or to be Burgesses or Free-
men of such Cities Towns Corporate Boroughs or Places [who] have either been
illegally turned out of the same or have been refused to be admitted thereto hav-
ing in many of the said Cases no other Remedy to procure themselves to be re-
spectively admitted or restored to their Offices or Franchises of Being Burgesses
or Freemen ... And ... in case any Person or Persons shall usurp intrude into
or unlawfully hold and execute any of the said Offices or Franchises it shall and
may be lawful to and for the proper Officer in each of the said respective Courts
with leave of the said Courts respectively to exhibit One or more Information or
Informations in the Nature of Quo Warranto at the Relation of any Person or
Persons desiring to sue or prosecute the same and who shall be mentioned in
such Information or Informations to be the Relator or Relators against such Per-
son or Persons so usurping intruding into or unlawfully holding and executing any
of the said Offices or Franchises and to proceed therein in such Manner as is
usual in Cases of Informations in the Nature of a Quo Warranto. Id. 9 4.
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as we understand that term, is irrelevant. The action was the
king's, filed by the king's attorney at the relation of a citizen,
and the king was clearly the most interested party in execut-
ing the criminal laws.
IV. THE INFORMER ACTION
Professor Berger also cited the "centuries-old 'informers'
actions" as going "beyond making available procedures to con-
trol unlawful conduct, and offer[ing] financial inducements to
strangers to prosecute such actions." 5 These informer ac-
tions, according to Professor Berger, were created by statutes
which encouraged members of the general public to enforce
acts of Parliament " 'by the promise of a share of the penalty
imposed for disobedience.' "236 And, Berger stated, "the pecu-
niary reward thus offered to strangers was little calculated to
lead colonial lawyers to read cognate remedies narrowly."27
Although it is unclear exactly what was meant by this last
statement, a close look at the eighteenth century understand-
ing of the "informer action" reveals that the common informer
was not understood to be one lacking a "personal interest" in
the proceedings.
As we have already seen, informer or qui tam actions were
created "by Acts of Parliament, which give a Penalty, and cre-
ate a Forfeiture for the Neglect of some Duty or Commission of
some Crime, to be recovered by Action or Information, at the
Suit of him who prosecutes as well in the King's Name as in
his own.""5 Blackstone described the qui tam action as a
species of property to which a man has not any claim of title whatso-
ever, till after suit commenced and judgment obtained in a court of
law: where the right and remedy do not follow each other, as in
common cases, but accrue at one and the same time; and where, bef
ore judgment had, no man can say he has any absolute property, eit
her in possession or in action."9
Berger, supra note 17, at 825-26 (emphasis in original).
Berger, supra note 17, at 826 (quoting 4 W. HOLDsWORTH, A HISToRY OF
ENGLISH LAW 356 (2d ed. 1937)).
7 Berger, supra note 17, at 826.
2181 BAcON's ABRIDGMENT, supra note 61, at 37.
2' 2 BLACKSTONE's COMMiENTARIES, supra note 69, at 437.
[Vol. 63: 1001
STANDING AND ENGLISH PREROGATIVE WRITS
Examples of this species of property included "penalties as are
given by particular statutes on an action popular.... Such as
the penalty of 5001, which those persons are by several acts of
parliament made liable to forfeit, that, being in particular
offices or situations in life, neglect to take the oaths of govern-
ment."' The penalty in such actions was "given to him or
them that will sue for the same."" Blackstone described the
rationale behind these actions in this matter:
Now here it is clear that no particular person, A or B, has any right,
claim, or demand in or upon this penal sum, till after action
brought; for he that brings his action and can [bona fide] obtain
judgment first, will undoubtedly secure a title to it, in exclusion to
everybody else. He obtains an inchoate imperfect degree of property,
by commencing his suit;, but it is not consummated till judg-
ment .... But, otherwise, the right so attaches in the first informer,
that the king (who before action brought may grant a pardon which
shall be a bar to all the world) cannot after suit commenced remit
any thing but his own part of the penalty. For by commencing the
suit the informer has made the popular action his own private ac-
tion, and it is not in the power of the crown, or of any thing but
parliament, to release the informer's interest.'
Thus, by bringing an action or information for a violation
of a statute, the common informer was understood to acquire
an inchoate property interest in the statutory penalty, which
interest would prevent others (including the king) from bring-
ing a subsequent suit for that same penalty. The informer then
had the exclusive right to that penalty (except for the portion
to which the king was entitled) should his action prove suc-
cessful. The informer action was, therefore,
one instance, where a suit and judgment at law are not only the
means of recovering, but also of acquiring property. And what is
said of this one penalty is equally true of all others, that are given
thus at large to a common informer, or to any person that will sue
for the same?'
Interestingly, the second such "species of property" men-
tioned by Blackstone wherein no claim or title existed until the
action was commenced and judgment obtained was "that of
20 2 BLACESrONE'S COmmENTARIES, supra note 69, at 437.
241 2 BLACKSMONE's Co wENTAIES, supra note 69, at 437.
242 2 BLACySToNE'S COMiENTARIES, supra note 69, at 437 (emphasis added).
24a 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMNTARIMS, supra note 69, at 437-38.
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damages given to a man by a jury, as a compensation and
satisfaction for some injury sustained; as for a battery, for
imprisonment, for slander, or for trespass."2" In such an ac-
tion, "the plaintiff has no certain demand till after the verdict;
but; when the jury has assessed his damages, and judgment is
given thereupon.., he instantly acquires, and the defendant
loses at the same time, a right to that specific sum."
245
Blackstone recognized that "this is not an acquisition so per-
fectly original as in the former instance," since "the injured
party has unquestionably a vague and indeterminate right to
some damages" as soon as he was injured.246 The jury verdict
and judgment do not, then, "vest a new title in him," but rath-
er they "fix and ascertain the old one.""1 Nevertheless, "as
the legal proceedings are the only visible means of this acquisi-
tion of property," Blackstone wrote, "we may fairly enough
rank such damages, or satisfaction assessed, under the head of
property acquired by suit and judgment at law."2"
Thus, the informer or qui tam action, at the time the con-
stitution was framed, stood on the same footing as the ordi-
nary tort action, wherein a property right was acquired and
recovered by the judgment itself. The legal right to bring the
action or information was given by statute, and by commencing
the action the informer obtained a vested property right in the
penalty provided for in the statute. Should the plaintiff fail to
assert that property interest, however, his suit would fail. For
example, Jacob said that qui tam informations would "not lie
on any Statute... unless the Whole or Part of such Penalty be
expressly given to him who will sue for it."2" This was "be-
cause otherwise it goes to the King, and nothing can be de-
manded by the Party."'0 This strongly suggests that a com-
mon informer was required to assert a "personal interest" in
order to invoke the court's power in eighteenth century Eng-
land.251
244 2 BLAcKsToNE's COmiENTARIES, supra note 69, at 438.
242 2 BLACKSTONE'S COmENTARIES, supra note 69, at 438.
2'6 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 438.
217 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMIENTARIES, supra note 69, at 438 (emphasis in original).
248 2 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 438.
2,9 2 BLACKSTONE's COMIENTARIES, supra note 69, at 438.
250 2 BLACKSTONE'S CO MENTARIES, supra note 69, at 438.
21 It is important to note that the eighteenth century understanding of the
[Vol. 63: 1001
STANDING AND ENGLISH PREROGATIVE WRITS
V. THE RELATOR ACTION
Professor Berger also cited the relator action as an exam-
ple of an eighteenth century English practice which "encour-
aged strangers to attack unauthorized action." 2 The relator
action, according to Berger, "deriv[ed] from the Crown's duty
'to see that public bodies kept within their lawful powers,' "M
and "flourished in England, where it was brought by the Attor-
ney General 'at the relation.., of some other person.'
As an example of such relator action, Professor Berger
cited the quo warranto statute of 9 Anne c. 20. We have al-
ready seen, however, that informations in the nature of quo
warranto, like other relator actions, were understood to be the
king's actions. Thus, they provide no support for the notion
that suits by "disinterested strangers" were commonplace in
the English courts of the eighteenth century. Moreover, the
quo warranto informations were filed by the king's attorney in
the King's Bench, the master of the crown office, not the attor-
ney general.
Furthermore, two of the three cases cited by Berger for the
proposition that a "relator" needed to have no interest in the
action were not quo warranto informations, but were ex officio
proceedings filed in chancery court by the attorney general to
insure the proper administration of charities. Blackstone de-
scribed such proceedings in this manner:
legal interest asserted by a common informer demonstrates only that such inform-
ers were not considered "disinterested strangers," but were indeed understood to
be asserting a legal right in those proceedings. While this legal right might be
sufficient to demonstrate that such informers were asserting a 'personal stahe" in
the controversy, separation of powers principles in the United States Constitution
limit Congress' ability to give the public at large penalties to prosecute others for
breaches of law. Particularly, Congress may not "convert the undifferentiated pub-
lic interest... into an 'individual right vindicable in the courts,' as to do so
would "permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,' Art. H, § 3." Lijan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 505 U.S. 555, 577
(1992). See also Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citi-
zen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1822 (1993) (Congress "cannot create individ-
uated injury by assigning the right to sue on behalf of the public to the highest
bidder or to the first bounty hunter on the scene.").
Berger, supra note 17, at 827.
Berger, supra note 17, at 826 (quoting H. WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 125-
26 (2d ed. 1967)).
"- Berger, supra note 17, at 826 (quoting WADE, supra note 253, at 113).
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The king, as parens patriae, has a general superintendence of all
charities; which he exercises by the keeper of his conscience, the
chancellor. And therefore, whenever it is necessary, the attorney
general, at the relation of some informant, (who is usually called the
relator) files ex officio an information in the court of chancery to
have the charity properly established."
Since these proceedings were brought ex officio by the attorney
general, the character of the relator in this type of action is
irrelevant. The plaintiff in the proceedings was the king, repre-
sented by his attorney general, and the king was clearly the
most interested party in these actions.
The two cases cited by Berger are, in any event, inconsis-
tent as to whether one with no personal interest could be a
relator in such an action. Berger first cited a 1741 decision,
Attorney General v. Bucknall,"' for the proposition that " '[i]t
is not absolutely necessary' " that the ""relators in an informa-
tion for a charity should be the persons principally interest-
ed .... [Any persons, though the most remote in the contem-
plation of the charity, may be relators in these cases.' "26
Professor Berger failed, however, to quote the very next sen-
tence of the opinion: "But it seems necessary that there should
be a relator, who has some interest.""'
The other case cited by Berger is an 1826 case, Attorney-
General v. Vivian, 9 which he said "dispensed with 'the least
particle of interest.' "261 In fact, the court in Vivian quoted
the language from Bucknall that the relators in an information
for a charity need not be the persons "principally interested,"
but explicitly refused to follow that rule:
Whatever opinions may have been formerly entertained on this
point, I conceive it to be now settled, that it is not necessary for
relators to have any interest in the subject of the suit.... I do not
apprehend that it ever has been required of a relator to show that
he has any interest in the relief sought.28'
3 BLACKSToNE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 69, at 427.
26 Eng. Rep. 600 (Ch. 1741).
27 Berger, supra note 17, at 826 (quoting Bucknall, 26 Eng. Rep. at 600).
Bucknall, 26 Eng. Rep. at 600 (emphasis added).
29 38 Eng. Rep. 88 (1826).
260 Berger, supra note 17, at 826 (quoting Vivian, 38 Eng. Rep. at 92).
261 Vivian, 38 Eng. Rep. at 92.
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In other words, the Vivian court simply refused to follow the
rule announced in Bucknall. And a statement by the Vivian
court reveals exactly why they failed to do so:
The main object of having a relator is, to secure to the Defendants
the costs of the information, in case it should turn out that the infor-
mation was improperly filed; whatever be the relief prayed, it is still
the information of the Attorney-General: and the Court must act
upon it, if the due administration of the charity call for the Court's
interference.
The informations brought by the attorney general ex officio in
chancery court for the control of charities were simply actions
between the king and the charities which he had the authority
to regulate. These were not, therefore, proceedings brought by
a "disinterested stranger," regardless of the degree of interest
needed by the relator in the due administration of the charity.
VI. THE WRrr OF MANDAmUS
Although Professor Berger wrote that the writ of manda-
mus is "not highly relevant" to show that the courts of eigh-
teenth century England allowed "attacks by strangers upon
jurisdictional usurpations,"2" he believed and stated that the
writ of mandamus had "an important complementary role to
play in the enforcement of duties colored with a public interest,
duties in which the 'personal interest did not rise to the digni-
ty of a 'cause of action.' "2 It is not at all clear just what
Professor Berger meant by this, but the cases he cited do not
support the view that "disinterested strangers" could obtain
the writ of mandamus.
Professor Berger first cited a case from 1652 wherein
"mandamus was granted to the parishioners and officers of the
parish of Clerkenwell 'to make the scavengers that are elected
to that office serve the office.' " However, nothing was said
in that case of the interest of the plaintiffs. Berger also cited
the Case of the Borough of Bossiny, 6 as an instance where
26 Id (emphasis added).
26 Berger, supra note 17, at 824.
2 Berger, supra note 17, at 824.
2 Berger, supra note 17, at 824 (quoting Anonymous, 94 Eng. Rep. 765 (1652).
26 93 Eng. Rep. 996 (1735).
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"mandamus issued to hold an election for mayor." "' Again,
nothing was said in that case as to whether or not the plain-
tiffs were asserting a "personal interest" in this action.
In another case, a writ of mandamus "commanded in 1733
that an election be held to fill a vacancy on the corporation of
Esham," 68 and in another the writ was issued "to compel the
justices of the peace 'to make rates for the relief of the
poor.' 269 There is no suggestion that those who obtained
these writs were "disinterested strangers." Interestingly,
though, Berger asserted that "[firom such cases a colonial
lawyer might well have concluded that mandamus was capable
of issuance at the suit of a stranger who sought to assert the
public interest."2 7' This statement is followed by a quote from
Coke describing the scope of the authority of the King's Bench,
and a quote from Lord Mansfield that mandamus" 'was intro-
duced to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and defect of
police. Therefore, it ought to be used upon all occasions where
the law has established no specific remedy, and where in jus-
tice and good government there ought to be one.' "271 Howev-
er, Berger provided no evidence that the writ of mandamus
was available to disinterested strangers. Indeed, one wonders
why "in justice and good government" a disinterested stranger
would need the remedy of mandamus.
Professor Jaffe, on the other hand, wrote that "there is
very little explicit evidence that the judges" of the eighteenth
century believed "a private individual.., had standing to
bring a mandamus to vindicate the public order.2 72 Indeed
Jaffe stated that "[tihe reported cases were almost uniformly
ones in which mandamus served the plaintiff as a 'reme-
dy." "273 There was one case, however, which Jaffe said sug-
gests "that the writ could be other than a 'remedy.' "2 In
267 Berger, supra note 17, at 824.
26 Berger, supra note 17, at 824 (citing Anonymous, 94 Eng. Rep. 471 (1733)).
2" Berger, supra note 17, at 824 (quoting Lidleston v. Mayor of Exeter, 90 Eng.
Rep. 567 (1697)).
' Berger, supra note 17, at 824-25.
" Berger, supra note 17, at 825 (quoting Rex v. Barker, 97 Eng. Rep. 823,
824-25 (1762)).
Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1270.
Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1270.
274 Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1270.
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The King and Queen v. St. John's College, an action was
brought against the Master of Cambridge to require him to
remove certain "fellows who had refused or neglected to take
the oath acknowledging the authority of the new establishment
of William and Mary and disavowing the authority of any alien
authorities."76 Jaffe stated that "[ilt is not clear who the
plaintiff was; it may have been the King not only in name but
in fact,"77 but the court issued the writ, and said that " 'it is
the Duty of the Court of King's Bench, to see that the Law be
executed.' 78 Again, nothing was said in that case of the
ability of a "disinterested stranger" to obtain a writ of manda-
mus.
Professor Jaffe also quoted Chief Justice Ellenborough for
the proposition that " 'there ought in all cases to be a specific
legal right.., to found an application for a mandamus.' en
In the cited case, the court refused to issue the writ of manda-
mus ordering the Archbishop of Canterbury to admit one Dr.
Highmore as an advocate in the Court of Arches.' "The
court held," Jaffe wrote, "that since he had no 'right' to be
admitted, he was not entitled to the order. This case clear-
ly demonstrates that one needed not only a "personal interest"
to obtain a writ of mandamus, but that the personal interest
had to rise to the level of a legal "right."
Authoritative legal writings of eighteenth century also
demonstrate that mandamus was not available to "disinterest-
ed strangers." Bacon described mandamus as a writ "com-
manding the Execution of an Act, where otherwise Justice
would be obstructed, or the King's Charter neglected.' The
writ was used by the King's Bench to
correct, not only Errors in Judicial Proceedings, but also extrajudi-
cial Errors and Misdemeanors, tending to the Breach of the Peace,
Oppression of the Subject, to the Raising of Faction, Controversy,
87 Eng. Rep. 366 (1693).
Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1271.
Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1271.
'8 Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1271 (quoting The King and Queen v. St. John's
College, 90 Eng. Rep. 245, 247 (1693)).
' Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1271 (quoting The King v. Archbishop of Canterbury,
103 Eng. Rep. 323, 326 (1807)).
Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1271.
1 Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1271.
3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 527.
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Debate, or any Manner of Misgovernment; so that no Tort or Injury,
whether Publick or Private, can be committed, but what may be
reformed and punished according to the due Course of Law.2"
Mandamus was an "established Remedy, and every Day
made use of, to oblige inferior Courts and Magistrates to do
that Justice, which, without such Writ, they are in Duty, and
by Virtue of their Offices, obliged to do."" The writ issued
"regularly only in Cases relating to the Publick and the Gov-
ernment,"" and only where "such Matter... [is] laid before
the Court, by which it may appear, that the Party is intitled to
it.'86 Thus "where a Man is refused to be admitted, or wrong-
fully turned out of any Office or Franchise that concerns the
Publick, or the Administration of Justice, he may be admitted
or restored by Mandamus." "8
Furthermore, "a Member of a Corporation, being only
suspended, and not.., totally removed, may have a Manda-
mus; because were it otherwise, they might always suspend,
and thereby not only effectually keep him out, but also deprive
him of all Remedy of Redress."28 A single mandamus could
not, however, be used to restore several persons to their office,
"because their Interests are several, and they might have been
removed for several different Causes."8 ' These statements
clearly suggest that one needed a "personal interest," indeed a
legal "right," to obtain the writ of mandamus.
In other cases, Bacon wrote, "[t]he Court of King's Bench
having a Superintendency over all inferior Courts and Magis-
trates," would issue the writ of mandamus to "oblige them to
execute that Justice which the Party is entitled to, and which
they are enjoined by Law to do."29 For example, "where the
Ordinary refuses to grant the Probate of a Will to an Executor,
or to grant Administration to the next of kin, he may be com-
pelled thereto by Mandamus."'9' These statements are very
23 3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 527 at 529-30 (emphasis added).
2" 3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 528.
28 3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 527.
28 3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 528 (emphasis added).
217 3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 529.
211 3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 534.
289 3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMNT, supra note 61, at 529 (emphasis added).
290 3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 534 (emphasis added).
291 3 BACON'S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 61, at 534.
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persuasive evidence that the writ of mandamus was not avail-
able to "strangers" seeking to prevent unauthorized actions.
Other writings also support the view that mandamus was
not available to disinterested strangers. Cunningham described
the writ as one issued by the King's Bench "to oblige inferior
courts and magistrates to do that justice, which, without such
writ, they are in duty... obliged to do."' The writ was used
"so that no tort or injury, whether publick or private, can be
committed, but what may be reformed and punished according
to the due course of the law. 3 Furthermore, the party seek-
ing the writ was required to demonstrate that he was "intitled
to it." 2
Similarly, Jacob described mandamus
as a Writ issuing out of the Court of King's Bench, sent by the King
to the Head of some Corporation, commanding them to admit or
restore a Person into his Place or Office, &c.... It lies to restore a
Mayor, Alderman or Capital Burgess of a Corporation; a Recorder,
Town-Clerk, Attorney turned out of an inferior Court, Steward of a
Court, Constable, &c.
The person seeking the mandamus "to be admitted to any
Office or Privilege, ought to suggest whatever is necessary to
entitle him to be admitted.""5 Indeed, the legal writings from
the relevant period consistently support the view that manda-
mus was available only as a remedy for parties injured by the
action (or inaction) of lower courts or government officials.
In sum, neither Professor Berger nor Professor Jaffe cited
any authority for the proposition that mandamus was available
during the eighteenth century to "disinterested strangers"
seeking to attack jurisdictional usurpations." Rather, the
cases cited, and other legal writings of that period, demon-
strate that mandamus was a writ available only to those who
seeking a remedy for injuries to personal legal rights.
CUNNINGHAf'S DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at MAN. Cunningham seems to
have relied on Bacon for much of his section on mandamus.
' CUNNINGHAM'S DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at MAN.
" CUNNINGHAM'S DICTIONARY, supra note 65, at MAN.
JACOB'S DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at MUA.
JACOB'S DICTIONARY, supra note 78, at MA.
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CONCLUSION
The notion that the English practice in prerogative writs
at the time the United States Constitution was framed allowed
(and even encouraged) "disinterested strangers" to attack 'ju-
risdictional excesses" has little, if any, support in the historical
legal writings of that period. For whatever reason, Professors
Raoul Berger and Louis Jaffe, both well-respected legal histori-
ans, simply ignored (or overlooked) a tremendous amount of
historical evidence tending to prove that the doctrine of stand-
ing, or at least the requirement of a "personal interest" in the
remedy sought, is consistent with what Justice Frankfurter
described as "the business of the Colonial courts and the courts
of Westminster when the Constitution was framed."297
Contrary to the assertions of Berger and Jaffe, the English
practice in prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto, mandamus,
informer, and relator actions, did not permit "standingless"
suits to protect the public interest. Perhaps Professor Jaffe was
a bit hasty when he accused Justice Frankfurter of
exaggerat[ing] ... the precision of the tradition,"298 as was
Professor Berger when he described Frankfurter's view as "his-
torically unfounded." 9
Moreover, the "public rights" theorists who blindly seized
upon the conclusions of Berger and Jaffe to chastise Justice
Scalia for his assertion that standing has "deep roots in the
common-law understanding... of what makes a matter appro-
priate for judicial disposition," 00 will find that their criti-
cisms rest on a frail foundation. Surely Professor Nichol too
hastily accused Justice Scalia of "ignor[ing] the scholarship of
the history of Article III."' Also premature was Professor
Lee's assertion that "Berger's and Jaffe's historical works thus
disprove Justice Scalia's assertion that the common law under-
standing dispositively favors reading 'cases' and 'controversies'
to impose a personal stake requirement."3 2 So too, Professor
"' Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. at 150 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
Jaffe, supra note 12, at 1308.
2 Berger, supra note 17, at 840.
'® Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 339 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301 Nichol, supra note 21, at 1151-52.
Lee, supra note 21, at 639.
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Sunstein should begin to look elsewhere for support for his
assertion that, "[a]s a matter of history, we have seen that
Scalia's claim is not sound; in fact, it is baseless," because
"courts had 'traditionally entertained' a wide variety of suits
instituted by strangers."' 3 Indeed, these advocates of public
rights adjudication have little (if any) support for their position
in the eighteenth century English prerogative writs. The his-
torical writings of that period consistently demonstrate that
courts did not intervene on behalf of "disinterested strangers,"
but insisted upon the plaintiffs assertion of some "personal
stake" apart from his interest as a citizen.
It will surprise few people today that legal scholars advo-
cating a more active federal judiciary distort or ignore our
legal history and traditions in their quest to transform the
judiciary into a quasi-legislature."' Legal education and
scholarship are dominated by academics whose ideas are clear-
ly inconsistent with our Nation's common law history and
traditions, and inconsistent with the ideas that prevail in the
democratic process.0 5 The courts are their last hope for suc-
cess, and history is simply an obstacle which must be overcome
in order to succeed. The ultimate result of this project, of
course, is "[tlo derange a whole process, evolved from the expe-
riences of millions of people over centuries of legal develop-
ment, on the basis of the beliefs or feelings of a particular
judge or set of judges."0 '
Strangely, these scholars take history much more seriously
when it appears to be on their side. I am sure they will be
disappointed that the eighteenth century prerogative writs do
not support public rights adjudication. Indeed, Justice Mar-
shall appears to have been in keeping with the historical Eng-
lish practice when he said that "[t]he province of the court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals."3  But I am
"' Sunstein, supra note 21, at 214.
It is important to note that Professors Berger and Jaffe are emphatically not
in this group. While I disagree with the conclusions they reached regarding the
prerogative writs, I have no doubts regarding their commitment to preserving our
legal history and traditions. Indeed, their contributions in this area have been
enormous.
" See generally, Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Gomorrah 34-55 (1996).
36 THOAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED 130 (1995).
' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)
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equally sure that the disappointment will not be great, and the
debate over public rights adjudication will continue. History
can be (and usually is) easily ignored.
